Most theories of risky choice postulate that a decision maker maximizes the expectation of a Bernoulli (or utility or similar) function. We tour 60 years of empirical search and conclude that no such functions have yet been found that are useful for out-of-sample prediction. Nor do we find practical applications of Bernoulli functions in major risk-based industries such as finance, insurance and gambling. We sketch an alternative approach to modeling risky choice that focuses on potentially observable opportunities rather than on unobservable Bernoulli functions.
something more complicated. Markowitz (1952, Figure 4 ) and Friedman and Savage (1948) , for example, proposed universal functions that have concave as well as convex segments.
One early study was encouraging in some respects. Edwards (1955) used a series of small and larger bets to repeatedly estimate individual utility functions for five male undergraduate students. None of the estimated Bernoulli functions departed consistently from risk neutrality, and several were consistently almost linear. Edwards used these functions, together with estimated subjective probability curves, to predict subsequent choices between pairs of bets. Due mainly to the probability curves, the predictions were far better than the naïve 50-50 prediction.
Demography. When they looked for it, later investigators typically found considerable heterogeneity across subjects' estimated Bernoulli functions. Could these differences be explained by demographics? Researchers might have hoped to make useful empirical generalizations of the form:
Lower middle class American males of age 30 typically have Bernoulli functions well approximated in the 5-parameter Friedman-Savage family with θ near (0, 20, 2.5, -1.2, 2.5), i.e., lower inflection point near income 0, upper inflection point near 20k, and CARA coefficients in the three segments of approximately a = 2.5, -1.2, and 2.5.
An upper middle income Japanese housewife of age 50 typically has a Bernoulli function approximated in the CRRA family with parameter r = 3.0.
Consider the field experiment reported in Binswanger (1980 Binswanger ( , 1981 Binswanger ( , and 1982 . For over 100 male farmers in India, the task was to choose one of eight alternative bets of form (x 1 , x 2 ) with 0 < x 1 ≤ x 2 and p 1 = p 2 = ½. The first alternative had no risk with x 1 = x 2 = 50 points, and the last alternative was x 1 = 0, x 2 = 200. The six intermediate alternatives were chosen so that the risk (here proportional to the payoff difference x 2 -x 1 ) has the same ordering as the expected value (here the simple average payoff (x 2 + x 1 )/2). Binswanger repeated the task with varying stakes.
His main conclusion was that the farmers tend to be more risk averse at higher stakes.
More germane to the present discussion, Binswanger (1981, Table 2 ) estimated the impact of demographic characteristics on his chosen risk aversion parameter, essentially ln(CRRA). Wealth, schooling, age, and caste all had insignificant coefficients; only Luck had significant impact! 1 1 Luck is defined for each subject as the number of trials where he received the higher payoff minus the number with the lower payoff. Our tentative interpretation is that farmers who win the small bets early on are more apt to choose riskier bets later. Sillers (1980) estimated a roughly similar distribution of risk parameters for Filipino farmers. However, despite considerable effort, neither Binswanger nor Sillers found any predictive power in the fitted Bernoulli functions for the risky choice of interest-whether the farmers adopted -green revolution‖ techniques. Sillers (1980, p. 211) summarized his results as follows. -This chapter briefly describes an attempt to use household risk preferences, as measured in the experimental game sequence, to test the impact of household risk aversion on the rate of fertilizer applied to the dry season rice crop. This effort failed to produce a satisfactory test of the importance of this relationship or its direction... .‖ Studies of (male) farmers in El Salvador (Walker, 1980) and in Thailand (Grisley and Kellog, 1987 ) also reached negative conclusions.
Surely gender is the most prominent demographic variable that might affect Bernoulli functions. Responses to survey questionnaires consistently indicate that women on average perceive greater risk than men in a variety of personal and social activities, and there is good evidence that women are less likely than men to engage in risky activities, legal and illegal. See Eckel and Grossman (2003) for a brisk summary. Of course, rather than differences in Bernoulli functions, the survey data differences might reflect mainly informational (or response bias) differences (cf., Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002) and arrest record differences might reflect mainly different opportunities. Harrison et al.'s (2002) field experiment did not reveal any differences in estimated risk attitudes by gender or age.
In principle, laboratory choice data can isolate the impact of gender on Bernoulli functions.
Many of the dozens of relevant studies seem to corroborate the conventional view that women tend to be more risk averse than men. Powell and Ansic (1997) , for example, report that their female subjects had less negative risk premiums (i.e., were less risk seeking) in laboratory tasks than the male subjects. However, there are also several laboratory studies that reach different conclusions. In particular, Schubert et al. (1999) find that women subjects on average are more risk averse in abstract gambling tasks in the gain domain, less risk averse in the loss domain, and not consistently different from men in context-rich tasks in either domain. They conclude:
Our findings suggest that gender-specific risk behavior found in previous survey data may be due to differences in male and female opportunity sets rather than stereotypic risk attitudes. Our results also suggest that abstract gambling experiments may not be adequate for the analysis of gender-specific risk attitudes toward financial decisions. [p. 385] . Table 1 in the Eckel and Grossman (2003) survey lists 24 findings from the literature, only half of which corroborate the conventional view; the others conclude that there are no systematic differences or that men are more risk averse. The authors conclude that the evidence is inconsistent, perhaps due to differences across studies in task details.
Wealth and age are often thought to be correlated with risk preferences, but there is little supporting evidence. Harbaugh et al. (2002) find young children's choices are consistent with under-weighing the low probability events and over-weighing the high probability events. This tendency diminishes with age and disappears among adults; age has no other discernable impact on risk preferences.
The literature contains some scattered results regarding ethnicity. Zinkhan et al. (1991) found that their Spanish subjects were more willing to take risks than the Americans. Harrison et al. (2003) report a field experiment in Denmark that showed no age or gender effects but indicated an education effect. Henrich and McElreath (2002) directly estimated the risk preferences of two groups of small-scale farmers (Mapuche of Chile and Sanghu of Tanzania) and, surprisingly, found them to be risk-preferring decision makers. Sex, age, land holdings, and income did not predict risk preferences and wealth was only marginally predictive. The authors note that these tribal people rarely engage in cash transactions, and conjecture that gambles in more familiar currencies such as livestock might yield different conclusions. Yook and Everett (2003) used investment company questionnaires with MBA students to assess their risk tolerance and risk capacity scores and found that age and gender played no role in explaining their portfolio held in stocks. The income variable loaded significantly, but that may have been due to their definition of risk tolerance. Leland and Grafman (2003) report a surprisingly negative result. They compare normal control (NC) subjects to others who had brain damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM). Earlier studies had found large performance differences in one complicated risky task, and the standard interpretation is that the VM brain structures are involved in making risky choices. However, these authors found no significant differences between the two groups for any of their simple risky tasks, and cite other studies that yielded mixed findings. The authors conjecture that VM brain damage affects the way people engage in a task and respond to feedback, but does not affect risk preferences per se. Harrison and Rutström (2008) apparently is the most comprehensive survey of recent laboratory experiments covering the impact of demographics on risk aversion. They argue that the most reliable instrument for measuring risk attitudes is the Holt-Laury multiple price list (MPL), 3 and report data from two large recent studies using the MPL in their Tables 2 and 3 , and report another recent study in Table 4 . 3 In each row j, the subject chooses between lottery A and lottery B. Lottery A has two prizes close together, e.g., x AH = $2 and x AL = $1.60, while the prizes are more extreme in lottery B, e.g., x BH = $4 and x AL = $0.10. The same probability p i of getting the larger prize applies to both lotteries in each row, e.g., p 1 = 0.10 in the first row, …, p 9 = 0.90 in the ninth row, and p 10 = 1.00 in the last row. Virtually all subjects will choose lottery A in the first row and lottery B in the last row. A subject who switches to B in the 4 th row, for example, is revealed less risk averse (or more risk seeking) than one who switches in the 5 th or 6 th row.
To summarize, measured risk aversion is negative for some tribesmen, and it may be slightly lower for men, business majors and some Hispanic groups, but the effects are neither large nor consistent across measurement instruments or risky choice tasks. All demographic characteristics examined in the literature we have found ---including gender, age, income, wealth, and ethnicity ---have a much smaller systematic effect than one might have supposed.
Indeed, most published studies (and one wonders how many studies that never saw the light of day) are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the demographics impact coefficient vector a d in equation (1) This question is different than the group-level stability question that is more often addressed in the literature. It is not without interest to find essentially the same distribution of parameter estimates for a particular group of subjects given the same task on a different day. But even when such a result holds, it merely suggests that naïve extrapolation of behavior on the first day should also predict well the behavior on the second day, without any benefit from the intermediate step of fitting a Bernoulli function on the first day's data. On the other hand, a shift in the distribution has implications regarding predictability. For example, Harrison and Rutstrom (2008, p.84-85 ) note a shift towards risk neutrality in the distribution of estimated relative risk aversion coefficients when the expected value was shown explicitly in an otherwise standard risky choice task. This implies that the estimated coefficient of at least some subjects changed in response to an inconsequential change in the task.
The crucial tests here measure risk preference of the same subject in several different ways. For over 100 subjects, Harlow and Brown (1990) A brief excursion on risk aversion and laboratory auctions may be instructive. Observed bids in first-price sealed-bid independent-private-value auctions are typically higher than in equilibrium derived from assuming risk neutrality. Risk aversion can account for such overbidding, as worked out most carefully in CRRAM (Cox et al., 1988 , the model used in (a) by
Harlow and Brown). Ockenfels and Selten (2005) challenge this explanation, and show that the steady state of a plausible adaptive process (IBE, or impulse balance equilibrium‖) also can explain overbidding. IBE can also explain the effect of information treatments, but risk aversion can only do so if the information treatment for some unanticipated reason were to shift risk parameters in just the right way. In theory, risk aversion leads to lower bids than does risk neutrality in third price auctions. Kagel and Levin (1993) find that actual bids indeed tend to be lower than the risk neutral benchmark when there are only 5 bidders, but tend to be above the benchmark, suggesting risk-seeking, when there are 10 bidders.
Returning to studies that track individual subjects across tasks, Isaac and James (2000) found a strong negative correlation between risk aversion as measured in a first price auction and risk aversion for the same individuals as measured via the traditional Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. The separate measurements corroborate earlier studies, so no additive bias correction, nor even a monotone transformation, can account for the inconsistent measurements across tasks. Berg et al. (2005) report a similar negative result, and offer the comment: -…Such a result leads to the difficult problem that there simply might not be such things as (risk) preferences… ‖ (p. 4213).
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) infer risk-seeking preferences when their subjects sell a gamble, and infer risk-averse preferences when the same subjects buy the gamble. Several studies, including and Berg et al. (1992) , and Fong and McCabe (1999) find that the nature of (and personal involvement in) the task and institution and substantially affects measured risk aversion.
At least one field study reports more encouraging results. Harrison et al. (2004) In fairness we should add that only recently have investigators focused on the crucial standard of out-of-sample prediction. Wilcox (2011) reports first results of a research program that could potentially yield more positive findings. He observes 100 risky choices per day on three consecutive days by 80 subjects, and uses 2/3 of the data to fit Bernoulli functions (together with subjective probability curves and a decision noise parameter). Wilcox proposes a normalization to deal with one sort of context effect, the width of the payoff range. He finds that statistical power is surprisingly low, but his design and econometric techniques are sufficiently strong to demonstrate that the normalization improves predictions of the 1/3 of the data not used in the estimations. Wilcox has not yet demonstrated that the best of his models can outpredict naïve extrapolation or can predict well in tasks that differ appreciably from the task used for parameter estimation.
Risk-based Industries
Even if it is not possible to predict individual acts of choice from estimated Bernoulli functions of individuals, it is still possible that these functions yield valuable insight into important macro-level phenomena such as stock and bond markets, insurance, and gambling.
Stock Market. Markowitz (1952) extended the logic of Bernoulli functions to construct a theory of how investors should select stock portfolios, and Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) elaborated the equilibrium implications. In particular, they predict a positive linear relation between the expected return on any asset and its incremental risk in a diversified portfolio; the slope coefficient is called β. Unfortunately, after some initial success, the prediction has fared poorly in empirical work (see Figure 1 ). Leading authorities conclude:
Like Reinganum (1981) and Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986) , we find that the relation between β and average return disappears during the more recent 1963-1990 period, even when β is used alone to explain average returns. The appendix shows that the simple relation between β and average return is also weak in the 50-year 1941-1990 period. In short, our tests do not support the most basic prediction of the SLB (Sharpe-Lintner-Black) model, that average stock returns are positively related to market βs. (Fama and French, 1992, p. 428 ). Brealey and Myers (1996) brazenly shift the burden of proof to those who may question the theory: -What is going on here? It is hard to say. …One thing is for sure. It will be very hard to reject the CAPM beyond all reasonable doubt.‖ (pp. 187-8). Whatever the source of these empirical difficulties-and many sources have been suggested-portfolio theory can no longer be counted among the success stories for the standard theory of risky choice. Mehra and Prescott's (1985) equity risk premium puzzle presents another serious problem for existing theory. Reasonable calibrations suggest that the stock market returns on average should carry a premium of about 0.5 percent above the returns on safest assets, but one expects to see a higher promised yield on lower-rated bonds simply because their holders must be compensated for accepting a higher expected default rate. Thus the higher yields to maturity on low-rated bonds cannot be taken as prima facie evidence that bondholders have concave Bernoulli functions.
Insurance. The negative actuarial (i.e., expected) value of insurance policies is often cited as evidence of widespread risk aversion. The mere existence of a vast insurance industry, 5 the usual argument goes, demonstrates the preponderance of concave Bernoulli functions over the outcomes of insured events.
We will argue in section 6 below that there are better explanations, and show that even risk neutral people have good reason purchase standard insurance policies. For now, we simply note that, with insurance as with bonds, the relevant risk consideration is the possibility of loss, not the dispersion of outcomes. In standard theory, risk-averse decision makers dislike positive deviations from the mean as much as they dislike negative deviations. The preponderance of downside insurance, and virtual absence of upside insurance, suggests to us that the usual argument may be missing something.
Gambling. Some eighty percent of US adults report having engaged in gambling at some time in their lives, and a significant minority are heavy gamblers. The gambling industry is surely large and pervasive enough to deserve theoretical attention.
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Just as economists invoke concave Bernoulli functions to explain insurance, they invoke convexity to explain gambling-for a convex Bernoulli function, the certainty-equivalent is larger than the expected value, making some negative expected value gambles acceptable.
Indeed, since a mean-preserving spread always increases the expectation of a strictly convex Bernoulli function, a rational person with such preferences will, at a fixed degree of actuarial unfairness, always seek the largest bet possible. A Markowitz-type Bernoulli function predicts a 5 In 2009, the insurance industry collected $4,066 billion in premiums world-wide, and $1,239 billion in the US and Canada alone, accounting for a significant fraction of the economy (Swiss Re 2010, p. 14). 6 The industry had gross revenue (amounts wagered less the amount paid to bettors) of $92.27 billion worldwide in 2007 (American Gaming Association www.americangaming.org/about/overview.cfm). If revenue was about 10 percent of the bet on average, the amounts wagered would be in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars. This is preference for gambles with an infinite downside, because the convex domain has no lower bound. Preferred bets for a Friedman-Savage Bernoulli function u, convex over only a finite interval [b, c] , are also much more extreme than one might think. John M. Marshall (1984) shows that the optimal fair bet (or the optimal bet with a moderate degree of unfairness) involves only two possible outcomes a and d such that and u'(a) = u'(d). As shown in Panel F of Figure 2 , these tangency points lie beyond a and b, the two Bernoulli function's inflection points, i.e., a<b<c<d, so the optimal bet is quite large. Also contrary to common sense, the model predicts that over the convex domain the person will always prefer uncertainty over certainty, and at any time of day or night is willing to pay to obtain a fair (or moderately unfair) gamble.
Gambling has provoked a considerable body of research. Most studies regard the monetary consequences as important but not the only factor relevant to gambling behavior.
Maximizing the expectation of a Bernoulli function, however complicated, accounts only for the monetary consequences. It ignores the thrill, the hormones, the heart rate and arousal, the bluff, the competition, and the show off (see Pope [1983] 
Summary.
Neither stock nor bond market data provide much empirical support for concave Bernoulli functions. The rapid expansion of gambling across the world doesn't either.
We will soon show that insurance can largely be explained by analyzing opportunity sets under risk neutrality. Empirical support for Bernoulli functions in macro phenomena thus seems to be as scarce as in micro-level observations gathered from laboratory and field.
Looking Backward
The concept of phlogiston, first suggested by Greek philosophers, entered the scientific mainstream with the work of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734). Postulated as an invisible compressible fluid that carried heat from one object to another, phlogiston appealed to intuition and seemed able to organize some disparate physical phenomena such as combustion of charcoal consistent with the estimated $550 billion wagered annually in organized gambling a decade earlier (National (it released phlogiston) and smelting of metal ores (the metal absorbed phlogiston). However, the concept produced vexing puzzles and few novel predictions. The fluid was never isolated in the laboratory. After the emergence of Lavoisier's powerful oxidation/reduction theory in the late 1780s, phlogiston theory faded away (McKenzie, 1960, chapter 6 itself, the value function predicts that people are risk-seeking in the loss domain, e.g., would not purchase insurance even at moderately subsidized prices. To explain unsubsidized insurance purchase and other inconvenient behavior, prospect theory supplements the Bernoulli function u with a probability curve w similar to that postulated in Edwards (1955) and earlier work. This flexibility (together with an unmodeled phase of editing and adjustment) allows prospect theory to rationalize a wide range of risky choice data, but we have seen no evidence that it can predict individual behavior in new risky tasks; see, among many other papers, Hey and Orme (1994) and Harless and Camerer (1994) . 
A Way Forward
An investigator encountering difficulties should instinctively return to first principles. In that spirit we ask: What is risk?
Since 1950s, economists have equated risk with dispersion of outcomes, typically measured in terms of the second moment of the distribution. But that is not the original meaning.
To older generations of economists, and to virtually all non-economists, risk refers to the possibility of harm. Dispersion matters only on the downside; the upside is not considered risky except by modern economists. 11 Perhaps it is time to rethink how to quantify risk.
Risk is multifaceted. Even technically sophisticated bankers distinguish operational risk from political risk and do not lump them together with counterparty risk, credit risk or market risk. The reason is that different levels and kinds of risk change the opportunity sets available to a decision maker in different ways. Our suggestion of the way forward, therefore, is to focus on how risk affects opportunity sets, rather than on how preferences interact with dispersion.
One reason for our suggestion is methodological. Traditionally, economists have distinguished themselves among social scientists by setting an austere standard for their work:
put the explanatory burden on potentially observable opportunities such as prices and incomes rather than on unobservables such as preferences or beliefs (e.g., Stigler and Becker, 1977) . This maxim has often led to distinctive predictions and new insights (e.g., Stigler, 1984) . Our point is that opportunity sets are potentially observable, while Bernoulli functions (and subjective probability curves) are not.
Another reason is the recent development of useful techniques. Options theory deals with one-sided phenomena and has enjoyed increasing success among financial market practitioners as well as academic researchers. As explained below, it seems useful for our purposes because some of the ways that risky choice interacts with established commitments can be described in terms of embedded real options.
We do not have a full-fledged theory to present, but instead will offer a series of illustrative examples. Consider once more the purchase of homeowners' insurance. What additional costs do people incur when they suffer losses from fire, theft, or accidents? It's not just the cost of replacement that matters, but also the time cost and aggravation of making temporary arrangements, and the increased difficulty of meeting contractual obligations. Such considerations can be captured in contingent opportunity sets, and they lead to new predictions, e.g., that homeowners with larger mortgages will carry more life insurance and less discretionary fire insurance. More generally, insurance simplifies one's life by reducing the number, diversity, and cost of contingency plans, and indirectly expands the opportunity set. It is hard to see how Bernoulli functions can capture these important considerations, or even explain life insurance.
Consider gambling. Pioneers such as Friedman and Savage (1948) thought it could be explained by convex segments of unobservable Bernoulli functions, but six decades of empirical search has not brought to light stable preferences of that sort. Indeed, Henrich and McElreath (2002) found subsistence farmers to be risk-loving in gains, while recent surveys such as Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008, p. 90ff , cast doubt that convexity exists in the loss domain. The opportunity set approach to risk would re-direct attention to potentially observable considerations such as bailout options. For example, one might predict that a low income member of a wealthy family is more likely to be a high roller because winning big would give 11 Ironically Markowitz, whose portfolio theory made the dispersion measure of risk so commonplace in economics, is an exception. Markowitz (1959, p. x) proposed negative semi-variance as a measure of risk and suggested that it might provide a better approximation of an individual's utility function, albeit less convenient than variance).
him clout as well as wealth, while loosing big would only reinforce his current status without seriously threatening his survival.
For routine implementation of the opportunity set approach, we suggest distinguishing gross payoff, the stated values of x in the risky gamble, from net payoff, the ultimate change y in purchasing power arising from the gamble. For the sake of parsimony, we suggest treating the decision maker as if she were risk neutral in net payoff, and assume that she chooses so as to maximize the expected value Ey of net payoff. The linear approximation should be quite good when the DM is dealing with small-to-moderate stakes and has access to reasonably efficient financial markets. For example, a gain or loss of $1,000 today implies a lifetime gain or loss of only a few nickels in daily consumption.
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It turns out that this rather simple framework can capture a wide variety of risky situations. To begin, suppose that a decision maker (DM) is endowed with some obligation z > 0.
If he fails to meet the obligation, he faces additional costs that can be approximated as a fraction a ε (0, 1) of the shortfall. For example, if the DM has a credit card balance of z = $1,000 on the monthly statement and pays only $600 by the due date, he will incur an additional cost of $400a, where a ≈ .02 is the monthly interest rate. Other obvious examples of z for household DMs include mortgage, rent, and car payments. Examples for business firm DMs include payroll obligations, debt service, and bond indentures. A biological example is the number of calories z needs to maintain normal activity; rebuilding depleted fat stores or muscle tissue incurs additional metabolic overhead of at least a = 0.25 and often considerably more (SchmidtNielsen, 1997).
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the resulting net payoff y(x) = x-z for x>z and y(x) = (1+a)( xz) for x<z. The function is concave and piecewise linear. If z is not precisely known at the time the DM makes a risky choice, e.g., if some random cash flow might partly offset the contractual obligation, then the expected net payoff y(x) is strictly concave over the support of z.
Fiduciary responsibilities also lead to concave net payoffs for the trustee. When she obtains a gross payoff for the client far above the expectations, her net payoff is only slightly higher than when meeting expectations, but when the gross payoff falls short of expectations her net payoff is far lower after taking into account the legal and reputation costs. Progressive income taxes induce a similar relationship between gross and net cash flows: the slope of the function y is less at higher x due to higher marginal tax rates.
Discrete, irreversible decisions are yet another reason for concave net payoff functions.
For example, suppose we see someone turn down a job offer whose expected present value clearly exceeds that of current salary plus all adjustment costs associated with the move. The usual interpretation is that this DM deducts a risk premium. Another possibility is that favorable new job offers are more likely for an established incumbent than for a new hire in a new city.
Thus accepting the new job might extinguish a valuable wait option, whose value a rational DM would deduct from the new job offer. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , for example, show that deducting the value of such options leads to net payoff that is concave in the gross job offer x.
In all these cases, an uninformed outsider-one who observes only gross payoffs-will not be able to distinguish a risk-neutral DM with concave net payoffs from a risk-averse DM with a linear net payoff function. An observer with better information on net payoffs can make the distinction, and avoid the specification error of attributing an unstable concave Bernoulli function to a risk-neutral DM with varying net payoff functions.
There are also plausible circumstances that lead to specification error in the opposite direction: a risk-neutral DM can appear to be risk-seeking because his net payoff function is convex in gross payoff. A simple example is a tournament whose the only prize P goes to the DM with highest x. Assume that each of K>1 contestants draws his gross payoff independently from the cumulative distribution G (obtained, for instance, in a Nash equilibrium of effort choices). Then the expected net payoff is y(x) = PG K-1 (x), which tends to be more convex the larger the number of contestants. Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the example for three contestants and uniform distribution G.
Business examples include decisions made in the shadow of bankruptcy, or bailout.
Suppose that failure to meet a contractual obligation z > 0 results in bankruptcy proceedings and shortfalls are passed to creditors, as in Figure 2C . The net payoff again is y(x) = x -z for x > z but now is y(x) = (1-a)(x -z) for x < z, where a ε (0, 1) is the share of shortfall borne by other parties.
This yields a piecewise linear convex relationship. Again presence of a random component to cash flows would smooth out the graph and make y a strictly convex function over the support of the uncertainty.
Bailouts create convex net payoffs in a similar manner. The U.S. savings and loan industry in the 1980s is a classic example. While deposit insurance was still in effect (i.e., a > 0), rapid deregulation made a whole new set of gambles available to these banks. The convex net payoff created an incentive to accept risky gambles in g. Indeed, some of the gambles with negative expected gross value have positive expected net value after considering the proceeds from deposit insurance; again see Figure 2C .
Certain opportunity sets would lead an uninformed outside observer to infer that a riskneutral DM has a non-linear Bernoulli function with concave and convex segments, as suggested by Friedman and Savage (1948) or Markowitz (1952) . Indeed, their intuitive justifications for these segments can be naturally re-interpreted as arising from opportunity sets that induce Figure 2E , which after the usual smoothing, becomes a
Friedman-Savage function (see Figure 2F ) with one inflection point in the interval (z 0 , z 1 ) and a second in (z 1 , z 2 ). But the characteristic non-linear shape is the result of the DM's net payoffs y(x) within the available opportunity set, not some sort of intrinsic preferences.
Marshall ( Finally, it may be worth revising the St. Petersburg Paradox that first inspired Bernoulli.
A gamble that pays 2 n rubles with probability 2 -n for every n = 1, 2, …∞, has expected value 1+1+1+…= ∞, but nobody will pay an infinite amount to play such a gamble. Bernoulli (1738) proposed that a person's willingness to play (ignoring base wealth w 0 ) is:
We acknowledge that utility may eventually diminish, but to us a more satisfactory resolution is to note that the opportunity set of the DM is bounded. The person offering the gamble must have finite ability (and willingness) to honor a promise; above some value 2 n = B, say, he is likely to default. Thus even a risk-neutral gambler should be willing to play no more than the expected value of the first n(B) =[ln B/ln 2] terms. In presence of upper bound B = one million rubles, the willingness to pay is less than 20 rubles.
To summarize, our suggestion for a way forward to a better understanding of risky choice is careful analysis of observable opportunity sets of DMs. In particular one should identify the relationship y(x) between gross and net payoffs, and see how far the simple risk neutral model can take us.
Concluding Remarks.
Extant theories of risky choice center on non-linear Bernoulli functions, but sixty years of empirical work has not yet made them operational. Instead of abandoning the approach, economists have proposed ever more complicated variants: utility functions with kinks, transformations via the distribution function (or rank-dependence), and subjective probability curves.
It is conceivable that such persistence will eventually pay off. Perhaps advances in econometric technique and larger scale experiments in the lab and field will isolate regularities in estimated Bernoulli functions that actually are useful in out-of-sample prediction. In terms of equation (1), this means finding stable context coefficients or idiosyncratic coefficients, or perhaps fairly simple interactions. (Of course, arbitrary interactions will not help predict out-ofsample.) Another possibility is that advances in neuroeconomics will make Bernoulli functions observable (for example, see Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007) . If so, the free parameter issue would be resolved and that would become a promising way forward. So far, however, the research suggests no simple mapping from brain processes to psychological and economic constructs, and we do not believe that a breakthrough is imminent.
Other approaches are available to applied theorists and empirical researchers who do not expect to succeed in the next few years where the previous 60 years have failed. Our own suggestion is to return to the roots of choice theory, and put the explanatory burden on potentially observable opportunities rather than on unobservable utilities and beliefs. Stigler and Becker (1977) proposed this as a general standard for economics research, and Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) can be re-interpreted as nice examples of this approach.
The foundations of finance are being reconstructed using options theory instead of risk aversion, and we believe parallel efforts hold great promise for other aspects of economics, including models of risky choice.
The academic literature on risky choice is vast, spread across many disciplines, and well beyond our capacity to read or review. We have tried our best (within personal constraints) to track down relevant studies and evidence, but it would be a miracle if we have not missed important and relevant pieces of work (and in the process created our own sampling bias as a matched twin of the familiar publication bias towards studies that find positive results.) We hope that you, our readers, will bring to our attention what we have missed. 
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